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INTRODUCTION

by applying the theory of timeus a greattoservice
anuel Utset does
inconsistent
(TI) behavior
the timeworn question of how we can
best deal with misconduct within corporate firms.' Whereas the timeconsistent (TC) actor weighs net benefits and costs according to a single,
exponential discount rate, the TI actor places heightened emphasis on

M
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Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.

1 Manuel Utset, CorporateActors, CorporateCrimes, and Time-Inconsistent
Preferences, 1 VA. J. CRIV. L. 266 (2013).
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immediate variations in costs or benefits. 2 Although TI and TC individuals
may share the same, welfare-increasing long-term goals at some starting
point (To), the TI actor inexplicably abandons those goals at some later
point, particularly when gaps occur between the delivery of costs and
benefits. In lay terms, time inconsistency explains why an individual can
pledge, quite sincerely, to eat healthily and exercise on January 1 st, but
then abandon thisnoal and instead devour a decadent piece of chocolate
cake on January 2 .
According to Utset, TI corporate actors suffer two opposing but
related maladies. They procrastinate investing in long-term valuable
projects that present steep up-front costs, and they engage excessively in
conduct that pairs immediate benefits with substantial but delayed costs. 4
Moreover, Utset reasons, corporations are quite likely to encounter TIrelated problems because corporations are inhabited by decision-makers
who repeatedly encounter gaps between the imposition of "costs" (e.g.,
writing a report, checking a piece of equipment, disposing of toxic waste
in a responsible manner), and the delivery of benefits (promotions,
increases in salary, respect by one's peers). Thus, Utset concludes, policy
makers who wish to deter "corporate misconduct" are best advised to
fashion their regulatory responses with TI actors in mind. 6 For Utset, this
prescription translates into an embrace of targeted enforcement regimes
that reduce the short-term costs of investing in corporate compliance and

Id. at 22. See also Eric Rasmusen, Some Confusions about Hyperbolic
Discounting,available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1091392.
2

3 For more on the field generally see Manuel Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals and
Repeated Time-Inconsistent Misconduct, 44 Hous. L. REv. 609 (2007). ("Hyperbolic
discounting involves very steep discounting in the immediate short run and much
shallower discounting further out."); Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DuKE L.J.
1285, 1349 nn.256 & 259 (2011) (citing GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 32 &
fig. 2B (2001)); David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 443, 446-51 (1997).

Utset, supra note 1, at 5-6, 13-16.
5

Id.
Id. at 7. (concluding that "TI corporate actors-and thus corporations-will be
systematically underdeterred by the sanctions that are optimal for TC actors").
6
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simultaneously delay or eliminate the short-term benefits of breaking the
law. 7
Utset's elegantly stated theory of TI misconduct is helpful on a
number of fronts. It adds to a growing literature that has strongly
challenged the use of crude sanction regimes to deter misconduct. It
perceptively demonstrates the ways in which the bias for immediate
benefits ironically encourages certain TI actors to forego otherwise
harmful misconduct.8 Finally, it offers a novel argument in favor of this
century's two major pieces of corporate and financial governance
legislation, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the Dodd-Frank
Act of 2011 (Dodd-Frank). 9
Although the TI-theory is fairly straightforward, it implies a
number of complex decisions for regulators seeking to reduce misconduct
within corporate firms.10 The optimal response to TI-related problems will
likely differ depending on context. With this caveat in mind, this
Comment explores, in Parts I, II and III, a series of related choices that
policy makers are likely to confront as they design legal regimes to deter
corporate misconduct. The first choice, discussed at length in Part I, is
between sanctions and enforcement. Where corporate misconduct has
reached undesirable levels, social planners must choose between an
approach that emphasizes increased sanctions and one that allocates
additional resources for increased policing and enforcement. Utset

"[R] educing the immediate benefits from misconduct or, in the case of
compliance procrastination, decreasing the immediate costs of complying with a legal
rule, is generally a more effective and economical way of deterring TI misconduct." Id. at
7
Utset, supra note 1, at 7.
9 Utset, supra note 1, at 8-9. See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (July 30, 2002); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (July 21, 2010).

10Utset couches his discussion as one of corporate criminal liability, supra note
1, at 1 & 4, but there is no reason to assume that the underlying conduct-much less the
TI behavior that exacerbates such conduct-should be subject to criminal law as opposed
to other types of regulation. Accordingly, I speak generically of "regulation" throughout
this piece, although such regulation could include a mix of criminal, civil and
administrative enforcement responses.
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believes that time-inconsistency explains the preference for enforcement
over sanctions, but as I show in Part I, a number of factors suggest that we
often should choose enforcement over sanctions, regardless of temporal
inconsistency.
The second choice, the subject of Part II, is between sanctionbased and structural enforcement. Here, social planners must decide
between negative laws that tell corporate officers "not" to do something
(such as Rule 10-b-5's antifraud provision"), and structural regulation that
directly intervenes in corporate affairs and directs corporate actors on how
to behave. Utset's defense of Sarbanes-Oxley presumes a sanction-based
model, whereby corporate actors alter their behavior in response to
increased monitoring by gatekeepers and other third parties. As I explain
in Part II, this emphasis on corporate policing has its drawbacks, in part
because it fails to consider the difference between intrapersonal and
interpersonal conflict. Time inconsistent actors are effectively conflicted
with themselves, whereas opportunists consistently favor their own
interests over that of others, regardless of legal obligation or contract.12 As
I explain in Part II, the policing strategies best designed to counteract
temporal consistency may not be optimal for identifying, deterring and
incapacitating this more dangerous group of opportunists. Part II then
closes by suggesting a different approach, which is what I refer to as
structural enforcement.
The third choice is between public regulation and private ordering.
When should public actors attempt to cure or mitigate temporal
inconsistency, and when should they step back and allow markets and
private ordering to do their magic? Utset backs away slightly from this
debate by suggesting that TI actors should be indifferent as to who solves

11 15 U.S.C. §78j(b); 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5.
12 1 recognize that an opportunist can also harbor time-inconsistent preferences.
As Utset perceptively demonstrates, time inconsistency ironically can improve social

welfare by causing the opportunist to delay wrongdoing when the upfront costs of
engaging in such wrongdoing seem too high. Utset, supra note 1, at 6. For a more indepth discussion of the interaction between one's motivation to do harm and one's
tendency toward temporal inconsistency and the various challenges this interaction poses
for an internalcorporate enforcer, see Miriam H. Baer, Confronting the Two Faces of
CorporateFraud,65 FLA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2014, manuscript on file with author).
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the TI problem so long as those solutions are most cost-effective. 13 Public
regulation versus markets and private ordering, however, is a central
debate in corporate governance scholarship. Moreover, any inquiry
premised on the utilitarian aim of reducing misconduct must contend with
the comparative benefits and drawbacks of public and private solutions.
Finally, assuming public intervention is necessary, which type of
regulation should a public actor impose? Here, I do not focus on specific
institutions or familiar debates over rules and standards.15 Rather, I
consider the differences between traditional mandatory regulation and the
more experimental, cooperative form of regulation that has been described
as "New Governance."
There are, of course, other questions that any regulator would
want to answer, which are beyond the scope of this Comment.16 My
purpose here is simply to show how Utset's behavioral analysis deepens
our understanding of corporate wrongdoing but does not necessarily offer

"All other things being equal, sophisticated actors should be indifferent
between their own commitment devices and those imposed by society." Utset, supra note
1, at 63.
13

14See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989) (praising "enabling" and non-mandatory aspects
of state corporate law); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The MandatoryStructure of CorporateLaw,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1553 (1989) (pointing out corporate law's mandatory
components and praising some as necessary and value-increasing). On the regulatory
front, compare John R. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REv. 707, 711 (2011) [hereinafter Coffee &
Sale, Redesigning] (invoking need for increased regulatory oversight of financial firms)
with Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark,
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1974148 (criticizing emergency-style
regulations adopted in the wake of crises) [hereinafter Romano, Regulating].
15 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An
Economic Analysis, 42
DuKEL.J. 557 (1992).
16 Like Utset, I do not spend much time here considering whether the regulation
of corporate misconduct ought to be based in criminal or civil law, although I agree these
are important questions to be considered. Nevertheless, I do assume, as Utset does, that
the public's primary goal is cost-effective deterrence.
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a clear-cut path for the well-intentioned public actors who desire to avert
it.1

I.

SANCTIONS OR ENFORCEMENT?

Imagine a public actor who confronts a series of wrongdoings
within a given context. The public actor could be a prosecutor, legislator,
head of a regulatory agency or division, or a judge. For the sake of
convenience, however, I will refer to that person generically as a
regulator,who seeks to deter conduct that reduces social welfare. 18 If our
regulator is intent on deterring or mitigating the effects of TI-related
misconduct, what types of rules and regulations should she implement?
The first question our regulator might ask herself is how she
should choose between "enforcement," which refers broadly to a series of
state actions encompassing investigation, prosecution and the setting of
penalties that economists frequently refer to as "sanctions." Rational
criminals refrain from wrongdoing when their net costs outweigh their net
benefits. 19 The criminal's net cost is portrayed as a function of two
variables: the sanction that ensues in response to a given act, and the
probability that the state will impose it.20 To deter wrongdoing, the state
should set the probability-adjusted sanction to equal the harm caused by

17 On the

general limitations of behavioral economics as a prescriptive guide for
lawmakers and regulators, see Doron Teichman, The Optimism Bias of the Behavioral
Analysis of Crime Control, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1697 (2011).
18 Utset's thesis does not focus on the retributive aspects of TI behavior.
Although there may be good reasons to consider whether TI behavior independently
triggers a retributive response, I have drafted this Comment with Utset's utilitarian

framework in mind.
19 See generally Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
20 Id. See also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic
Theory of

PublicEnforcement ofLaw, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 49 (1998) ("In general, he will
commit the [harmful] act only if his expected utility from doing so, taking into account
his gain and the chance of his being caught and sanctioned, exceeds his utility if he does
not commit the act.").
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such wrongdoing, or p(S) = H.21 Note that the S in the above equation can
22
be a fine, or a nonmonetary sanction such as prison.
Given that detection and prosecution are costly, social planners
might well presume that the most cost-effective way to deter misconduct
is to impose monetary sanctions, thereby setting "S" at maximal levels,
23
and "p" at minimal levels in order to conserve enforcement resources.
But as economists and criminologists long ago realized, sanction-heavy
regimes create a number of unintended problems. If sanctions are fines,
and the fines are set too high, then many potential wrongdoers may
become judgment proof.24 In the corporate context, this arguably is one of
the reasons we hold corporate entities vicariously liable for their
-25
employees' crimes.
To overcome the judgment-proof problem, deterrence theorists
support nonmonetary sanctions, such as prison, even though imprisonment
imposes separate and quite substantial costs on society. Nonmonetary
sanctions create translation and calibration problems for policy makers
Where the state has decided that all activity is undesirable and seeks "complete"
deterrence, it should set the adjusted sanction equal to the criminal's expected gain.
Where the activity includes socially desirable conduct and the state seeks solely
"optimal" deterrence, it should set adjusted sanctions to equal the victim's loss. See
21

generally Albert Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations,
46 AM. CRIV. L. REV. 1359, 1391 n. 173 (2009), citing A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, PunitiveDamages:An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 918 (1998).
22

Prison is necessary both because individuals may be judgment proof and

because they may require incapacitation. See Daniel Fischel & Alan Sykes, Corporate
Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 322 (1996) (explaining judgment-proof problem). The
fact that individuals may be judgment proof is also a justification for corporate liability,
although not necessarily corporate criminalliability. Id. at 322.
23 Becker, supra note
19, at 213.
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the CriminalLaw, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 1193, 1203-05 (1985) (explaining strategies for overcoming the judgment-proof
problem).
25 See also Renier Kraakman & Jennifer Arlen,
Controlling Corporate
24

Misconduct: An Analysis of CorporateLiability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 687, 692
(1997) [hereinafter Kraakman & Arlen, Controlling] ("[C] orporate liability is generally
needed because, for example, individual agents are judgment-proof or government
sanctioning of agents is too costly.").
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seeking optimal deterrence. It is one thing to say that a fraudster should
"internalize" his $100,000 fraud, but it quite another matter to estimate
how much prison time corresponds to the harm caused by that fraud.2 6
Aside from the translation problem, sanctions are also burdened by
their declining marginal effect on deterrence. 27 Prison sentences are
expressed in units of time; fines are expressed in units of money. For each,
there is a marginal decline in the disutility posed by each additional unit.
Thus, a ten million dollar fine does not cause ten times as much disutility
as a one million dollar fine, and a ten-year sentence of imprisonment is not
twice as horrible as a five-year sentence of imprisonment. Accordingly, as
a state resorts to imposing increasingly heavier and harsher sanctions, the
additional deterrent effect decreases.
Sanction-heavy approaches also impair marginal deterrence from
more to less serious crimes. If the state spends little on enforcement, then
it must impose uniformly high sanctions for both moderate and seriously
harmful conduct.2 8 Wrongdoers might then decide that it is "cheaper" to
engage in more wrongdoing and not less. The corporate officer who
perceives a massive fine for spilling even an ounce of waste on the ground
26 "When sanctions and harm are not strictly monetary in nature, there is a
translation problem: The sanction that the government sets might not accurately reflect
the harm the defendant causes, regardless of the probability of detection and
punishment." Miriam Baer, Evaluatingthe Consequences of CalibratedPunishment:A
Reply to ProfessorKolber, 109 COLUM L. REV. SIDEBAR 11, 13 (2009) [hereinafter Baer,
Evaluating];see also Cass Sunstein, On the Psychology ofPunishment, 11 Sup. ECON.
REV. 171, 180-81 (2003) (explaining that decision makers render incoherent
punishments in part because "those entrusted with the task of 'mapping' lack a modulus
with which to discipline their decisions").
27 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility
and Discountingof

Imprisonment and the Theory ofDeterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1999) (exploring
implications of declining disutility and criminals' discounting of extended periods of
imprisonment). For evidence from social psychology that long prison sentences offer
declining social utility, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems
ofAffective Forecasting,80 IND. L.J. 155 (2005) (explaining that criminal defendants'
ability to adapt to imprisonment reduces effectiveness of longer prison sentences).
28 See Steven Shavell, CriminalLaw and the Optimal Use
ofNonmonetary
Sanctions As a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1245-46 & n.52 (1985) [hereinafter
Shavell, CriminalLaw] (explaining how uniformly maximal sanctions eliminate marginal
deterrence of less harmful crimes).
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might decide that it is prudent to risk spilling much more. Accordingly, a
schedule of gradually increasing sanctions (in proportion with the harm
and corresponding probability of detection) is preferable to a regime based
on several blunt, draconian sanctions. This complicated schedule,
however, introduces new costs: administrative costs (since there will be
more haggling about the schedule and how to set it), transaction costs
(since defense lawyers and prosecutors will strike bargains according to an
increasingly complex schedule), and error costs (the costs that accrue
when the schedule fails to approximate harm and probability of detection,
or when a well-written schedule is applied improperly).2 9
Sanction-heavy regimes are also problematic because they provide
the public with less reliable information about emerging problems or
evolving forms of wrongdoing. With fewer enforcement agents on the
ground, the government necessarily collects less information-including
less data about how its own enforcement agencies are performing. Less
information, in turn, leads to less effective detection and prosecution
techniques. Note that this information vacuum also affects potential
offenders. When enforcement levels are low, offenders are likely to make
greater mistakes calculating their overall likelihood and costs of
punishment.
It is important to note that the foregoing problems exist, regardless
of whether individuals employ consistent or inconsistent discount rates.
The discount rate simply tells us the rate at which future expected utility
(or expected disutility) declines. Some individuals employ high rates, and
are said to be present-oriented, myopic or to display low self-control.
Others employ much lower rates, valuing later benefits (and later
disutility) much more than their myopic counterparts. 30

On the costs of adjudicative error, see generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of
Accuracy in Adjudication:An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307 (1994). For a
discussion of administrative and error costs that arise within contextual corporate crime
regimes, see Vikramaditya Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top ManagementMatter?, 91
GEO. L.J. 1215, 1244-46 (2003).
30 "[M]any criminologists have stressed poor self-control or willpower
problems
29

as a key individual variable associated with crime. This claim could result either from
time inconsistency of the sort explored here or from internally consistent but unusually
high discount rates." Richard McAdams, PresentBias and CriminalLaw, 2011 U. ILL. L.
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Putting aside time-inconsistency, it is doubtful that individuals
across a large population employ the same discount rates. Some people are
patient and wait their turn, whereas others grab what they want and act on
impulse. Even without the TI-related complication, this heterogeneity
poses tremendous challenges for our regulator. First, the regulator may err
and choose a sanction with the wrong discount rate in mind. The
implications of such error grow if the regulator resides in a high
sanction/low enforcement regime. 31 Accordingly, regulators should choose
less than maximal sanctions when they are unsure of the relevant
population's discount rate.
By contrast, a regime that focuses more intently on enforcement
and keeps sanctions relatively low can gradually identify and calibrate its
enforcement efforts towards the group of individuals that are presumed to
maintain the highest discount rates. 32 As time passes and enforcers receive
additional information, an enforcement-heavy regime may do a better job
of identifying and responding to high-discount rate individuals than a
regime that stresses sanctions over enforcement.
I could go on, but the foregoing provides a clear enough picture:
there exist numerous reasons for regulators to invest resources in those
factors that increase the probability of detection and punishment, and not
to rely exclusively on high sanctions as a method of deterring misconduct.
To this mix, Utset has added the theory that individuals maintain
inconsistent discount rates relative to a single point in time. The theory is
both plausible and intuitive, and Utset's survey of empirical evidence is
quite convincing.3 3 But there are numerous other behavioral and economic
factors that justify an emphasis on enforcement and not exclusively
REV. 1607, 1609 (2011) (distinguishing time-inconsistent individuals from those
possessing internally consistent, but abnormally high, discount rates).
31 See Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of CorporateFraud,
94 VA.
L. REv. 1295, 1306-07 & n.39 (2009), citing Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow,
Optimal Sanctions When IndividualsAre Imperfectly Informed About the Probabilityof
Apprehension, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 365, 366-67 (1992).
32 I have referred to this concept, in previous work, as calibrated
policing. See
Baer, Evaluating,supra note 26, at 14 (explaining concept of calibrated policing and
arguing that it is likely more efficient than calibrated punishment).
33 Utset, supra note 1, at 11-13.
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sanctions. TI theory does not explain this emphasis, but it does join the
many arguments in favor of it.
II. SANCTION-BASED

ENFORCEMENT

OR

STRUCTURAL

INTERVENTION?

Having decided that emphasizing sanctions is insufficient to deter
wrongdoing, our regulator now faces a new choice: What type of
enforcement mechanisms should she promulgate? Should she allocate
increased resources to government enforcers, who can then more ably
police corporate firms? Or, should she mandate so-called structural
interventions? If so, what might those interventions look like? I explore
these issues below.
A. SANCTION-BASED ENFORCEMENT

The standard regime that regulators invoke in response to
misconduct is what I refer to as a "sanction-based" enforcement regime.
This is the type of regime in which the state enacts a law or regulation
forbidding certain conduct, imposes sanctions for transgressing the law or
regulation, and backs up the sanctions through public enforcement efforts.
From this perspective, a law that tells corporate officers not to engage in
fraud is not terribly different from a law that commands motorists not to
speed on a highway.3 4
Sanction-based enforcement regimes can deter TI behavior by
increasing the up-front costs of undesirable behavior. Substantial
investments in enforcement-provided those investments make
enforcement more "salient" in earlier periods-can vastly increase the
likelihood, severity and swiftness of a sanction, all of which increase
deterrence for both TI individuals and other criminals who happen to
34 Professor Edward Cheng summarizes this approach: "The legislature issues a
command prohibiting the undesired conduct, and if these commands are violated, the
state pursues, prosecutes and punishes the offender. Other citizens are subsequently
deterred, and the legislature succeeds in addressing the problem." Edward Cheng,
StructuralLaws and the Puzzle ofRegulating Behavior, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 655, 656
(2006).

VirginiaJournalof CriminalLaw

362

[Vol. 1:2

harbor high discount rates or are simply opportunistic. 35 Similarly, broad
definitions of misconduct, as well as liability for attempts and mere
scheming, also increase the up-front costs of misconduct because they
increase the putative offender's immediate risks. 36
Utset's Article discusses at length sanction-based enforcement
regimes, which increase the costs of misconduct immediately after the
misconduct occurs or which delay immediate benefits to later time
periods.3 7 We might think of this as "targeted" enforcement. Many of the
criminal or quasi-criminal provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
that Utset praises appear to fall within the targeted sanctions category. As
Utset points out, SOX's various criminal and reporting provisions increase
the costs of misconduct by making it more likely that others will object to,
or report, a corporate officer's fraud or misrepresentation.38 Moreover,
because the offender is likely to encounter objecting employees far earlier
in time than external enforcement agents, SOX succeeds in accelerating
the costs of misconduct back in time, to the moment when a corporate
officer or employee is particularly likely to fall to temptation.
Although targeted sanctions do, as Utset observes, improve
deterrence, they also carry serious drawbacks. Enforcement is itself
expensive, and investments in enforcement may be distorted by political
factors, such as an enforcement agency's political clout with legislators.
Enforcement is also difficult; it is far from obvious that the internal
controls envisioned by SOX can counteract much of the rationalization
and cognitive dissonance that arises in corporate settings, when officers
and employees slide, almost imperceptibly, from aggressive behavior into
downright illegal misconduct. 39

Utset, supra note 1, at 38-40.
36 McAdams, supra note 30, at 1617-18. McAdams points
out that these
enforcement-based moves affect present-biased offenders by immediately increasing their
risks of arrest. Id. at 1618.
35

37 Utset, supra note 1, at 38-41.
38

Id. at 53-54.

39 On the limitations of internal controls, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The
Appeal and Limits ofInternal Controls to FightFraud,Terrorism and Other Ills, 29 J.

CORP. L. 267 (2004).
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Consider SOX. Portions of the Act adopt a standard enforcement
approach; they increase the probability of punishment for corporate
officers who mislead the market. The Act creates criminal liability for
those who retaliate against corporate whistleblowers, expands the
obstruction of justice statute to include interference with audits and
investigations, requires CEO's and CFO's to certify the truthfulness of
their companies' financial statements, and subjects them to criminal
liability for certifying such claims falsely. 40 These are what one might
refer to as the "external" enforcement provisions of the Act. Other parts of
the Act encourage the growth of "internal" corporate policing, such as
Sections 302 and 404, which require the corporation to affirm and
establish a system of internal controls for learning and reporting material
-41
financial information.
From these multiple provisions, one can divine two legislative
goals. The first is to signal to corporate officers the government's
willingness to devote substantially greater resources to the apprehension
and punishment of those who engaged in false or misleading financial
reporting. The second, which is more controversial, is to force corporate
firms to internalize the costs of enforcement by improving their own
internal monitoring and policing networks.42 However reasonable the two
goals may be in theory, both impose substantial costs. 43
Policing is not an unconditional good. It can, depending on how it
is implemented, create additional unintended problems for the
corporation's shareholders and society. It can endow a group of persons
within the corporation the power to demand resources that are not
40 See, e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperationand the New Corporate
CriminalProcedure,82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311, 331-32 (2007) (summarizing various
provisions that expand criminal liability in connection with corporate reporting).

41See generally Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the
Impact ofSOX404, 29 CARDozo L. REV. 703, 705-06 (2007) (defending and explaining
Act's emphasis on internal controls).
42 See Miriam H. Baer, Governing CorporateCompliance, 50
B.C. L. REv. 949
(2009) [hereinafter Baer, Governing].
43 For an evenhanded discussion of SOX's costs and benefits, as well as the
importance of how it is perceived by regulators and regulated entities alike, see Donald
Langevoort, The Social Construction ofSarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REv. 1817 (2007).
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necessarily justified by rational cost-benefit accounting. 44 It can cause
corporate employees to put a "price" on good behavior that previously did
not exist, and which may exceed the bounty the government is willing to
pay.4 5 It can reduce employees' intuitive inclinations to comply by
triggering more adversarial relations between the corporation and its
employees. 46 And, as recently demonstrated, it can cause corporate
directors to focus excess energy on finding so-called "bad actors" or
evidence of intentional wrongdoing, and ignore more long-term but
equally vexatious problems, such as failing business operations or
increased exposure to systemic risks. 7
Aside from the foregoing problems, corporate policing suffers
from a more fundamental problem, which Utset's discussion of temporal
inconsistency brings into focus. Policing-at least the overt, "in your face"
variety-may cause divergent reactions among individuals who display
intrapersonal conflict between their long and short term selves, and

An entire industry of compliance consultants and attorneys has flourished in
the wake of SOX's enactment. See Baer, Governing, supra note 42, at 993-99
(discussing growth of compliance industry); Donald Langevoort, InternalControlsAfter
Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting CorporateLaw's "Duty of Care as Responsibilityfor
Systems", 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 965-68 (2006) (explaining how push for internal controls
benefits certain actors, such as attorneys, consultants and accountants).
1 For example, Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel found, through experimental
testing, that where informants lacked a "moral imperative" to report wrongdoing, the
state's offer of a low reward triggered less reporting than alternate approaches. Yuval
Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The ComparativeEffectiveness of
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and ProtectionsforReporting Illegality, 88 TEx. L. REv.
1151, 1155 (2010).
46 See Baer, Governing, supra note 42,
at 985-90.

" See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasingthe GreasedPig Down Wall Street: A
Gatekeeper's Guide to the Psychology, Culture and Ethics ofFinancialRisk-Taking, 96
CORNELL L. REv. 1209, 1214 (2011) [hereinafter Langevoort, Chasing] (arguing that
corporate gatekeepers and monitors must watch for more than "visible signs of
disloyalty" and that "hard work, intensity, optimism, and enthusiasm can sometimes be
the source of the trouble").
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individuals who consistently favor themselves over those whose interests
48
they purport to serve.
Much of corporate law focuses on the reduction of interpersonal
conflicts, which are generically known as agency costs. 4 9 Utset's primary
contribution to the deterrence literature is to demonstrate that corporate
policymakers must also take into account intrapersonal conflicts. As Utset
perceptively notes, however, the two dispositions can sometimes combine
in ways that benefit society.50 For example, some opportunists ironically
may be deterred by their own need for instant gratification, and therefore
forego criminal conduct that requires an upfront investment in time and
-51
patience.
Time inconsistency, however, is hardly a solution for opportunism
and agency costs. Some percentage of opportunists will be cunning,
patient, and rationalenough to choose a long-term plan of misconduct and
stick to it. Just as it may be folly to ignore TI-related misconduct, so too is
it folly to ignore rank opportunism.
At this moment, a well-intentioned regulator comes to an important
fork in the road. Should she worry more about the initially well-meaning,
"spur of the moment" fraudster or the rank opportunist? Which group
poses a greater danger to corporate firms and their shareholders?
We might consider TI-individuals less dangerous than rank
opportunists. One of the most important implications of Utset's distillation
of TI theory is that time-inconsistent individuals may initially harbor longterm socially desirable goals. In other words, the TI corporate officer at To
may well desire the same long-term outcomes as shareholders and the

4 For the sake of this Comment, I am treating these two populations as if they
are completely separate. In a forthcoming article, Confronting the Two Faces of
CorporateFraud,I offer an extended account of how opportunism and temporal
inconsistency might interact and shape the corporation's employee population. See Baer,
supra note 12.

49 See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 73 (2008).
50

Utset, supra note 1, at 8.

51

Id.
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general public. 52 It is only at some later, unexpected point in time that the
TI officer loses his resolve to comply with the law, and succumbs to the
temptation to engage in socially undesirable behavior.5 3
By contrast, a time-consistent opportunist simply enjoys his own
personal welfare to the exclusion of everyone else's - and he knows it.
This self-knowledge and self-control, in turn, renders the rank opportunist
more dangerous because he can more effectively cover up any evidence
that he has done anything wrong. 54
Notice, then, the problem for our regulator: Requirements that
corporate firms create compliance departments, screen and educate their
employees, and improve internal auditing of financial statements,
primarily improve overt enforcement efforts. Such enforcement may
deflect the sudden, TI-related temptation to substitute misconduct for lawabiding conduct when performance falls short of previously set metrics.
Overt enforcement, however, will be far less effective in eliminating
sophisticated, intentional scheming. Instead, overt enforcement may cause
opportunists to (a) cast about for equally harmful substitutes,5 6 and (b)
For the sake of simplicity, I am admittedly assuming that shareholders and
the general public harbor the same socially desirable goals.
52

53 See generally Utset, supra note 1. Utset concedes that some TI individuals
may harbor socially undesirable goals at To. Indeed, he creatively demonstrates that TI
increases societal welfare by causing the TI opportunist to abandon her planned
wrongdoing because it does not accord her sufficient immediate gratification. For a
different, but in many respects similar account of how corporate employees may slide
into fraudulent conduct, see generally, Sung Hui Kim, The Banality ofFraud:ReSituating the Inside Counsel as Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 983 (2005) (explaining
how a person's situational factors may encourage and permit the person to engage in
wrongdoing such as fraud).
5 For a similar type of analysis, see Shavell's explanation for imposing more
serious criminal penalties on intentional misconduct. See Shavell, CriminalLaw, supra
note 28, at 1248 ("[I]ntent may be linked to the probability that a party will escape a
sanction, since a party who intends to commit a harmful act is more likely to choose a
particular place and time to avoid identification and arrest, or to take steps thereafter to
do so.").

5 See Utset, supra note 1, at 26.
56 On the potential for substitutes, see Neal Kumar
Katyal, Deterrence's
Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REv. 2385, 2391 (1997) (exploring how enforcement of
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take greater care to avoid detection.17 To use a simpler analogy, when
drivers see a police officer's car on a highway, they slow down for a
temporary stretch of time, but they do not necessarily abandon all
speeding. To the contrary, the worst and most knowledgeable offenders
simply find other roads on which to drive (and speed).
To counteract this problem, a regulator might therefore choose
covert enforcement methods. When covert enforcement (including
undercover stings and wiretapping operations) is well known and
advertised, it creates a number of problems for offenders, who must screen
their compatriots more carefully, look over their shoulder more often, and
view potential clients with more suspicion. 58
Covert enforcement, however, creates other costs, such as lost
transparency, the potential for government corruption, reduced trust
between government actors and private citizens, and worrisome violations
of privacy.5 9 Moreover, covert enforcement also poses an interesting
problem for the group that is the focus of Utset's inquiry. Because it is
conducted secretly, covert enforcement may be less effective in steering
extremely "naive" TI individuals away from temptations to commit fraud.
And for the naive TI individual, out of sight is largely out of mind.
Accordingly, the regulator who conducts covert enforcement is not likely

trafficking in one narcotic may cause criminals to choose to traffic in a different
narcotic); Samuel Buell, Good Faith and Law Evasion, 58 UCLAL. REv. 611, 612-613
(2011) (observing that the enactment of a law intended to forbid conduct "can defeat
itself by causing people to develop new behaviors designed to avoid its force").
5

Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331

(2006).
Indeed, Richard McAdams cites these up-front costs favorably because they
impose an immediate cost-the increased threat of detection-on time-inconsistent
criminals. McAdams, supra note 30, at 1619-20. McAdams does not consider, however,
the relative salience of threats posed by covert as opposed to overt policing. Although
covert policing can become salient (following the announcement of multiple arrests at the
conclusion of a complex sting), it may eventually recede into the background and thereby
fail to deter those time-inconsistent offenders who possess short memories.
58

59 See Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutionaland Communal
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 645 (2004).
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to figure prominently in the TI actor's decision-making process, unless the
fact of such covert enforcement is particularly salient and well known.6 0
This leaves our well-intentioned regulator with an ugly choice:
Rely primarily on overt enforcement, and leave untouched those
intentional opportunists who find ways to cover up their behavior, or rely
primarily on covert enforcement efforts, and reduce deterrence among
naive TI individuals. Perhaps in some contexts the choice is
straightforward. In others, the regulator may seek other alternatives, one of
which I discuss below.
B. STRUCTURAL REGULATION

Apart from sanction-based enforcement, public actors can reduce
temporally inconsistent decision-making by mandating changes in how the
corporation governs itself. In other words, instead of punishing or
threatening to swiftly punish someone for engaging in misconduct, the
regulator can design a structure at To that all but removes a corporate
manager's freedom to bow to such temptation at T1 . For the purposes of
this Comment, I refer to these interventions collectively as "structural
regulation." 61
The preference for structural regulation over sanction-based
enforcement has been discussed in a number of fields, ranging from traffic
control to taxation.6 2 Rather than punish an individual for making the
"wrong" choice, such as speeding or failing to pay one's taxes, the
regulator creates certain structural rules that limit the individual's range of
choices in the first place.63

60

By contrast, a more sophisticated TI-actor might respond to the possibility of

covert enforcement by avoiding wrongdoing. See McAdams, supra note 30, at 1620.
61 See generally Cheng, supra note 34; Leandra Lederman,
Statutory Speed
Bumps: The Roles ThirdPartiesPlay in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REv. 695 (2007)
(exploring the value of structural laws in procuring increased tax compliance).
62 See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 34; Lederman, supra
note 61.
63 "Structural

laws establish mechanisms or procedures that push citizens toward
compliance by making the undesirable behavior less profitable or more troublesome."
Cheng, supra note 34, at 657.
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Structural regulation bears much resemblance to the vaunted precommitment devices that TI theorists (including Utset) often praise.6 4 The
key distinction between pre-commitment and structural devices is the
creator of the device. Public actors promulgate and design structural
regulation, whereas private actors often create and bind themselves
through pre-commitment devices. Then again, perhaps the distinction is
not so strong. As Utset observes (quite favorably), public regulators can
promote and devise "off the rack" commitment devices, which private
actors (or firms) then adopt.6 5
The distinction between commitment devices (which private actors
often adopt) and structural regulation (which public actors mandate) bears
significant importance for political purposes. As a society, we are far more
willing to accept our own limitations on decision-making than those
limitations that government actors impose on us. Accordingly, it seems
unlikely that TI individuals will be "indifferent" as to the source of the
limitations on their decision-making abilities. When possible, they will
favor their own commitment devices over government-mandated
regulation, even when regulation provides better outcomes over the long
run.
Structural approaches are far from perfect. Public actors who
devise and promulgate structures are human and prone to error. Indeed,
they may suffer the same TI-related maladies that the rest of the populace
suffers. For example, public actors may choose structures that sound
pleasing and gather quick political support, but fail to attack TI-related
harms over the long run. Moreover, they may choose structures that
eliminate TI in one instance, but create other unintended, long-term and
costly problems in others.

See, e.g., Steven Bainbridge, PrecommitmentStrategiesin CorporateLaw:
The Case ofDead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 4-5 (2003) (describing four
varieties of pre-comnmitment strategies); John Robertson, Paying the Alligator:
Precommitment in Law, Bioethics and Constitutions,81 TEX. L. REV. 1729 (2002)
(identifying pre-commitment devices across various contexts); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000)
(analyzing arguments in favor of pre-commitment devices, including those retained
across generations).
64

65 Utset, supra note 1, at 61-63.
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As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, "structure" in theory is
more easily embraced than "structure" on the ground. Thus, the regulator
who prefers structural strategies must give some thought to the "who" and
"how" aspects of structural reform. Should public institutions mandate
structural reforms for all or some category of corporate firms? Should the
same institutions coax the emergence of such reform through a quasipublic cooperative regime? Or should the public institution leave
structural reform to the private markets, intervening only when necessary
to shore up information asymmetries or ensure robust competition? I take
up this next set of questions below.
III. PUBLIC INTERVENTION OR PRIVATE ORDERING, OR SOMETHING
ELSE?

It is one thing to say that structural devices can reduce timeinconsistent decision-making within corporate firms. It is quite another
proposition to say that the government should mandate or even encourage
those devices. Accordingly, in this section, I consider the next choice that
most regulators would likely confront: public intervention or private
ordering?
Utset suggests that the TI individual who seeks a "fix" for his
inconsistency will be indifferent as to its source. 66 But as citizens, we are
not indifferent to whether improvements in corporate governance emanate
from public or private quarters. To the contrary, one of the major debates
in corporate law scholarship is the extent to which public law ought to
dictate governance relationships within the firm, or instead leave the
negotiation of such relationships to a well-functioning private market.67
Related to this inquiry is the question of how much the federal government
ought to interfere in what was previously believed to be the state-province

Utset, supra note 1, at 62.
See, e.g., William Bratton, Unentrapped,77 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 677, 680
(2009) (listing private ordering versus regulation as one of the three major debates in
corporate law).
66

67
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of corporate governance. It is no accident, for example, that Congress
enacted the two major statutes upon which Utset rests much of his focus. 6 8
Finally, the time-consistency's prevalence-inside and outside of
corporate firms-demands a theoretical basis on which one can justify
public mandates and sanctions. Lots of people procrastinate and overeat,
but they usually do not go to jail or pay fines for their costly behavior. If
Utset seeks solutions that benefit society and reduce the incidence of
corporate misconduct, then his TI theory is incomplete without a further
consideration of who is best positioned to create the devices most likely to
curtail TI-related problems.6 9
A. MARKETS AND PRIVATE ORDERING
In many instances, markets and private ordering should reduce the
threat of time-inconsistent behavior. We all procrastinate commencing and
finishing time-consuming projects, and many of us eat and drink too much
and spend too much time in front of the computer or television when we
could be doing something more productive with our time. But a number of
entrepreneurs have created and marketed devices to cure us of these
various habits. We can purchase gym memberships to commit ourselves to
exercising; enter retail layaway programs to enforce household savings;

"Federal law has long regulated discrete aspects of corporate governance, but
regulating a firm's internal affairs-the relationship among its shareholders, directors,
and officers-has traditionally been left to the states. That separation is eroding. New
laws, principally at the federal level, directly regulate director and officer conductmoving beyond the "enabling" feature of state corporate statutes to draw bright-line rules
around corporate conduct that encroach on substantive areas traditionally beyond federal
68

reach." Charles Whitehead, Why Not CEO Term Limits?, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1263, 1270
(2011) [hereinafter Whitehead, Why Not?]; see also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A.
Sale, Securities Fraudas CorporateGovernance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56
VAND. L. REv. 859 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Delaware'sCompetition, 117 HARV. L. REV.
588, 591-92 (2003).
69 This question might not be relevant if Utset premised his
argument on a

retributivetheory of TI-related misconduct. Were Utset to argue, for example, that TIrelated conduct is wrongful and therefore deserving of some form of condemnation or

similar intervention by the state, then we could ignore the claim that markets and private
ordering do a fairly good job of disciplining temporal inconsistency.
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and agree to certain compensation deferral terms in order to demonstrate
our long-term commitment to our employers.
In the corporate arena, markets can efficiently match TI-consumers
with commitment device entrepreneurs. 7 0 The private ordering inherent in
markets enables individuals and businesses to choose the pre-commitment
devices that best fit their individual circumstances and attributes.n
Moreover, it allows corporations and shareholders to test different types of
devices, embracing the ones that improve corporate governance and
backing away from the ones that do not.
Apart from private ordering, strongly competitive markets
discipline TI-related misconduct by imposing swift and harsh sanctions on
procrastination and over-consumption.7 2 Simply put, the knowledge that
someone else will take our place if we falter forces us to work harder and
longer, and forces us to subdue our TI inclinations.
Movie stars are remarkably disciplined about their weight because
they know excess pounds will cause the pool of available roles to dry up.
Employees with at-will contracts know that if they fail to show up to work
too many times, they may be swiftly terminated. A strong competitive
market forces its participants to reign in their TI tendencies.
Despite the foregoing, markets do not drive out all TI related
harms. Markets cannot discipline poor decision-making when market
71

On the efficient coordination characteristics of markets, see generally

THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 23 (W.W. Norton, 2006)

(arguing that the market "does remarkably well in coordinating or harmonizing or
integrating the efforts of myriads of self-serving individuals and organizations").
71 On the benefits of private ordering generally, see D.
Gordon Smith, Matthew
Wright & Marcus Hai Hintze, PrivateOrderingwith ShareholderBylaws, 80 FORDHAM
L. REv. 125, 128 (2011) (explaining that private ordering flows from the insight that
"different firms have different attributes that require different governance structures").
The authors further argue that private ordering can improve corporate governance by
enabling "each corporation to become a laboratory of corporate governance,
experimenting with different models of shareholder participation and ultimately
producing a diversity of governance forms and practices." Id. at 174.
72 See Isabelle Brocas & Juan Carillo, Rush and
ProcrastinationUnder
HyperbolicDiscounting and InterdependentActivities, 22 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 141
(2001) (providing a theoretical model demonstrating that competition reduces TI-related
behavior).
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participants have the ability to hide bad outcomes from the rest of the
marketplace. Excess weight, unproductiveness and workplace absenteeism

are relatively transparent; it is no surprise that competitive markets
respond relatively quickly to these problems. Evidence of bad decisionmaking in other contexts, however, may be more difficult to detect. This is

particularly likely when: (a) the decision in question involves a fair
amount of discretion and (b) the decision-making takes place within a
complex organization, whose operations may be opaque to outsiders.
The standard solution for this type of problem is the
implementation of mandatory disclosure rules, along with sanctions that
strengthen compliance with such rules.7 3 Disclosure reduces information
asymmetries, encourages market participation by consumers and investors,
and enables investors to discipline poorly performing corporate
74
managers.
Other problems hamper market discipline. For example, a brisk
market for corporate control ought to discipline managerial procrastination
and overconsumption. If managers make enough bad decisions,

73 Securities disclosure provides other related benefits, including "a more
efficient allocation of resources in the economy as a result of improved corporate
governance, increased capital market liquidity and the consequent reduction in the cost of
capital, and the reduction in resources used by secondary market investors to gain
advantages over each other in a race to discover information already known by issuers

but unannounced." Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability andMandatoryDisclosure, 109
COLUM. L. REv. 237, 252 (2009). Fox presumes that disclosure rules will be buttressed
by penalties for nondisclosure and false disclosure. Id. at 273; see also Paula J. Dalley,
The Use and Misuse ofDisclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1089,
1092 (2007).
7 See generallyFox, supra note 73, at 255-59 (explaining how disclosure
enables shareholders to cast informed votes for directors, bring lawsuits where fiduciary
duties appear to have been breached, or to sell stock). Nevertheless, disclosure is not an

unqualified good. Excessively costly disclosure rules will force some firms out of the

market, which in turn will reduce competition and leave the field to larger (and more
opaque) firms. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Public & Private Ordering and the Production
ofLegitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELLL. REv. 1123, 1135-36(1997)
(explaining how introduction of SEC disclosure rules caused smaller unlisted firms to
bow out of capital markets, leaving field to larger firms that were already subject to
disclosure requirements due to their listing on the New York Stock Exchange).
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shareholders ought to sell their stock. 5 A low stock price, in turn, offers
more enterprising managers the opportunity to purchase the company and
extract more value.
Public lobbying by corporate managers, however, has reduced the
effectiveness of the market for corporate control by making hostile
corporate takeover contests more expensive and less likely.7 6 This in turn
reduces the beneficial effect of competition on TI-prone officers and
directors.
By the same token, the cost of proxy contests and the difficulty of
placing a dissident's name on the corporate proxy reduce competition for
corporate director seats.7 Officers maintain their position and their
compensation, even when performance is sub-par.7 8 Directors too maintain
their positions, even when their oversight is weak. 79 The fault is not the
market per se, but a number of laws that weaken shareholder and marketbased discipline.

Whereas disclosure's strongest proponents envision it as a means towards
reducing the agency costs of opportunism and interpersonalconflict (managers favor
themselves over shareholders), the time-inconsistency literature demonstrates that it also
reduces the costs created by intrapersonal conflict (managers fail to adhere to the socially
desirable goals they previously set).
7

76 JONTHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 122-26 (2008).
7 See, e.g., Lisa Fairfax, The Uneasy Casefor the Inside Director,96 IOWA L.
REV. 127, 157-58 (2010) (explaining how incumbents' access to corporate proxy creates
difficulty for shareholders to successfully nominate dissidents and challenge board seats).
7
1 See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE:

THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE PAY (2004).
7 "By making it easier for shareholders to replace
directors, proxy access can
contribute to making directors more accountable to shareholders and more attentive to
their interests." Lucian Bebchuk, Private Orderingand the Proxy Access Debate, 65
BUS. LAW. 329, 337 (criticizing current "no access" default rule for dissident
shareholders who seek to challenge incumbent directors and citing empirical evidence
that proxy fights and improved competition for director seats improve shareholder value).
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Finally, markets may fail when market participants ignore and
misjudge relevant information.so This was likely the case in the lead-up to
the mortgage securities slump that triggered the 2008 financial crisis and
ensuing recession.si As Michael Lewis's popular book, The Big Short,
nicely depicts, a fair amount of publicly available information suggestedindeed established-the precarious nature of mortgage-backed securities.82
The investors who star in Lewis's story all reached the conclusion that
mortgage lenders had abandoned prudent lending practices 8 3 and that the
various tranches of mortgage securities would become worthless as soon
as real estate appreciation ceased and teaser rates on subprime mortgages
reset to much higher rates, triggering defaults.84 Nevertheless, these few
individuals were sheer outliers, if not social outcasts in the social financial

o "Intervention in financial markets rests in large part on the assumption that

investors-either due to hubris, cognitive bias or "irrational exuberance" -are naturally
inclined to take on unwarranted investment risks, especially in economically prosperous
times." Chris Brummer, How InternationalLaw Works (And How itDoesn't), 99 GEO.

L.J. 257, 268 (2011).
81 See, e.g., Langevoort, Chasing, supra note 47, at 1210. Steven Schwartz,
Understandingthe Subprime FinancialCrisis,60 S.C. L. REV. 549 (2011) ("[T]he

making and monetization of subprime mortgages was not per se evil"). The alternate
view of the crisis is that financial managers purposely hid information or at least failed to
make the information "salient" to investors and corporate gatekeepers. See Langevoort,
Chasing, supra note 47, at 1210-11; Frank Partnoy, Don 't Blink, 77 BROOKLYN L. REV.
151 (2011) (criticizing financial institutions for failing to provide risk related information
in a more salient manner).
82 "The catastrophe was foreseeable, yet only a handful noticed."
MICHAEL
LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 105 (2009).
83 Id. at 26-28 (describing one hedge fund manager's detailed analysis of the
securities and their underlying mortgages). Market failure may also partially explain why
lenders entered increasingly complex mortgage contracts with purchasers who lacked
sufficient income to pay: "In many cases borrowers were not reckless; they were
imperfectly rational. In many cases lenders were not evil; they were simply responding to
a demand for financing driven by borrowers' imperfect rationality." Oren Bar-Gill, The

Law, Economics and Psychology ofSubprime Mortgage Contracts,94

CORNELL

L. REV.

1073, 1075 (2009).
4 LEWIS, supra note 82, at 30, 47. "The catastrophe was foreseeable, yet only a
handful noticed." Id. at 105.
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culture Lewis describes.8 5 The rest of the market not only invested in
worthless mortgages, but also sold credit default swaps,86 guaranteeing the
very financial institutions whose books would come to be filled with so
much dreck. As The Big Short and other contemporaneous accounts
demonstrate, much of the conduct that created systemic risk and produced
catastrophic loss was fueled not by outright deception, but instead by some
noxious mix of herd behavior, over-optimism, loss aversion, moral hazard,
and yes, time-inconsistent behavior.8 7
The internal policing reforms outlined in SOX do not-and
cannot-address these aforementioned behavioral issues.8 8 For the above
One of the investors profiled in Lewis's book diagnoses himself with
Asperger's syndrome. Id. at 181. A second was infamous for his lack of social skills. Id.
at 4. And a third triggered his mother's suggestion that he start taking Lithium when he
predicted a global financial meltdown. Id. at 160. Langevoort poses a similar question:
"We know that some investors bet aggressively on a coming crisis. They estimated
correctly, so why did so many buyers trust the salespeople? Plenty of academics and
journalists, moreover, warned about the subprime risk beginning early in the decade."
Langevoort, Chasing, supra note 47, at 1211 (raising doubts that "sellers" systematically
exploited information asymmetries to defraud "buyers" of subprime mortgage risk).
85

86 "AIGFP's decision to enter the CDS market was based, in part, on computer
simulations that indicated there was a 99.85% chance it would never be obligated to
make a CDS payment." Whitehead, Why Not?, supra note 68, at 32; see also William
Sojstrom, The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 943, 958 (2009) (observing AIG's
Financial Products unit may have been attracted to the credit default swap business
because it superficially resembled its "casualty insurance business, a business in which it
had been profitably engaging for years").
87 "What shocked [hedge fund manager Steve] Eisman
was that none of the
people he met [at an investing conference] in Las Vegas seemed to have wrestled with
anything. They were doing what they were doing without thinking very much about it."
LEWIS, supra note 82, at 158. Steven Schwarcz has written several articles carefully
analyzing the crisis and summarizing its causes into three general categories: "conflicts,
complacency and complexity." See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure'sFailurein the
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 1109 (explaining limitations of disclosure

for complex products); Steven L. Schwarcz, Markets, Systemic Risk, and the Subprime
Mortgage Crisis, 61 SMU L. REv. 209 (2008); Steven L. Schwarcz, ProtectingFinancial
Markets: Lessons from the Subprime MortgageMeltdown, 93 MINN. L. REv. 373 (2008).
8 The exception may be SOX's internal controls requirement, although the
types of controls necessary to identify and address legal noncompliance may differ from
the types of controls necessary to identify and address excessive risk-taking. Cf Steven
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form of market failure, where most of the players fail to judge risks
appropriately and create systemic risks that threaten the country's
financial health, a different type of public intervention is necessary; it
must go beyond the type of disclosure-oriented regulation that has, until
now, characterized much of securities regulation. Given the risks that
financial market failure poses-illiquidity and total market meltdown-we
should expect financial regulation to feature a lot more structure and a lot
less reliance on private markets, or for that matter, private policing.
B. MANDATORY STRUCTURES
Let us assume that at some point, a regulator concludes private
ordering and markets are insufficient protection against TI-related
misconduct. Our regulator might then ask, "how should I promulgate these
rules or structures? Should I make them mandatory or offer institutions
some choice or role in designing how these structures will function?"
A mandatory structure is one that leaves actors no choice but to
adhere to it. A requirement that forces banks to set aside prescribed
reserves, thereby reducing the risk of insolvency, is such a structure, as is
a requirement that limits an institution's ability to trade on its own
accounts. 89 The Dodd-Frank Act contains these types of structures, which
are intended to protect against systemic meltdowns created in part by TIrelated mistakes. 90

Bainbridge, Caremarkand EnterpriseRisk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967 (2009)
(arguing the difference between legal compliance and enterprise risk management is one
of degree).
89 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank:
Contingent Capitaland the Need for Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 795, 797 & n.3 (2011) (describing new oversight regulations and capital
adequacy requirements); Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing FinancialRegulation, 90
B.U. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (2010). On proprietary trading, see Jeffrey Manns, Building Better
Bailouts: The Casefor a Long-Term Investment Approach, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1349, 1382
(2011) (discussing limitation on trading by banks on their own accounts).

90See generally, Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
ProtectionAct, 1854 PLI/Corp 15 (2010) (Providing a 124-page summary of the Act).
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Also embedded in Dodd-Frank are a number of corporate
governance provisions, whose efficacy has been highly contested. 91
Nevertheless, one still can divine some value in the provisions insofar as
TI-related misconduct is concerned. For example, Dodd-Frank's "say on
pay" provision requires public corporations to submit to their shareholders
a non-binding vote on the corporate officers' compensation. 92 By forcing
directors to face a periodic vote on employee compensation-even a nonbinding vote-the statute forces directors to confront officer nonperformance when they might otherwise procrastinate doing so.93
Despite these modest benefits, I am less certain that temporal
inconsistency can justify the various mandatory provisions contained in
statutes as broad as SOX and Dodd-Frank. Some have argued that
concerns fueling SOX's were overstated, and there exists at least one
study indicating that corporate governance was not a cause of the 2008
financial crisis. 94
More generally, large behemoth statutes would not appear to be the
optimal vehicles for devising efficient structural solutions for TI-related
misconduct. Governance is a tricky issue and temptations to shirk and
over-consume may differ depending on the situation. Accordingly, some
temptation-reducing structures promulgated by legislators and regulators
may be unnecessary or overly costly, at least in regards to some firms.95
91 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank:Quack FederalCorporate
Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REv. 1779 (2011).
92 Although the vote is nonbinding, I characterize the
say-on-pay rule as

"mandatory" because the law forces public corporations to solicit their shareholders'
voice on compensation matters.
93 For a discussion of say-on-pay and Dodd-Frank's additional compensationrelated disclosure obligations, see Roger Coffin, A Responsibility to Speak: Citizens
United, Corporate Governance andManagingRisks, 8 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 103, 116-17
(2012).

See Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance "Fail"Duringthe 2008
Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (2009). On
skepticism regarding the need for Sarbanes-Oxley, see Romano, Regulating,supra note
14, at 8; Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 Hous. L. REv. 77 (2003).
95 Many critics of SOX contended that its internal controls requirements
imposed excessive costs on smaller public companies. For a summary of empirically-
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Moreover, it is difficult to place faith in political actors who
promulgate massive structures when those actors are themselves
temporally inconsistent- and politically motivated. 96 Some regulators may
adopt structures, not because they work, but because they please the public
or special interest groups. Once in place, these structures may be difficult
to remove. Path dependence, the political costs of overturning regulation,
and the general preference for the status quo all may contribute to the
cementing of structures that fail to cure TI behavior and impose various
costs on corporate entities. At the very least, this ought to be cause for
caution.
C. EXPERIMENTAL REGULATION
Prior to the financial meltdown, one of the more interesting

developments in regulatory theory and practice was the move towards
smarter, more responsive regulation.97 This movement, collectively
labeled "New Governance" in academic circles, recognized that regulators
and private entities could collectively gain from sharing information and
adjusting regulatory rules and penalties in response to that information
over time. 98 The new regulatory approach reflected the insight that it is
cheaper to persuade than it is to punish. 99 Accordingly, New Governance
based criticisms of SOX, see Roberta Romano, Does the Sarbanes-OxleyAct Have a
Future?, 26 YALE J. REG. 229, 239-51 (2009).

Steven Davidoff and David Zaring's account of the financial bailout as
"regulation by deal" could just as easily be an example of regulation driven by the need
for short-term results. See Steven Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The
Government's Response to the FinancialCrisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 463 (2009).
96

97

See, e.g.,

IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION

(1992)

98 For an overview and explanation of New Governance theory and regulatory
approaches, see Jason Solomon, Book Review, Law and Governance in the 21st Century
Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REv. 819 (2008) (book review); Michael C Dorf & Charles
Sabel, A Constitution ofDemocraticExperimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 267 (1998);
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall ofRegulation and the Rise of Governance in
ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342 (2004).
99 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE,
expensive; persuasion is cheap").

supra note 97, at 26 (observing that "punishment is
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theorists called for private and public actors to join forces in finding
mutually agreeable solutions and to step away from more adversarial,
lawyer-heavy approaches to ongoing problems. 100 The New Governance
approach promised to be more effective, more flexible and even more
democratic, insofar as it permitted stakeholders and community members
a place at some idealized continuous negotiating table. 101
During the same time period, behavioral law and economics
scholars demonstrated the importance of physical and intellectual
architecture.102 The placement of a statement on a form (in bold or regular
font), the order in which one encounters dessert or fruit (or heaven
forefend, vegetables) in a cafeteria, or the structure of the tax code, are all
examples of how a public official can encourage or discourage private
decision-making by individuals or business entities. For choice
architecture proponents, the government's subtle alteration of private
choices was largely cause for celebration and not concern. Left to their

100 Under the rubric "experimentalism," Professors Sabel and Simon summarize
New Governance's key tenets:
In experimentalist regimes, central institutions give autonomy to local
ones to pursue generally declared goals. The center then monitors local
performance, pools information in disciplined comparisons, and creates
pressures and opportunities for continuous improvement at all levels.
The regimes' distinctive mechanisms for achieving both learning and
coordination emphasize deliberative engagement among officials and
stakeholders.
Charles F. Sabel and William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the
Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 55 (2011).
101"The central tenet of new governance literature posits that traditional
command-and-control, top-down regulation has been supplanted, to varying degrees, by
new forms of collaborative and polycentric governance, often involving dynamic
cooperation between the public sector (formerly the "governors") and the private sector
(formerly the "governed"), and often characterized by an increased participation in
governance by third-party nonstate actors." Robert F. Weber, New Governance,
FinancialRegulation, and Challenges to Legitimacy: The Example of the InternalModels
Approach to CapitalAdequacy Regulation, 62 ADMINL. REV. 783, 785 (2010).
102 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY
IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008).
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own devices, private individuals make mistakes that are both personally
and socially costly.10 3 Choice architecture helps individuals avoid these
mistakes.
As Orly Lobel and On Amir pointed out in a 2010 book review,
choice architecture and New Governance complement each other.io4 New
Governance provides regulatory architects with a platform in which to
experiment with different "choice" structures. Because it is premised on
cooperation and free flows of information, New Governance also provides
choice architecture with some needed legitimacy; private actors know and
actively aid public actors in putting in place the architecture that
encourages and discourages certain choices. This is a key point; without
private actors' participation in their creation, the devices appear more
manipulative and paternalistic, and therefore more likely to fail.
Following both the financial accounting scandals at the turn of the
century, and the later financial crisis in 2008, we might have expected an
explosion of experimental, responsive, nudge-like structural suggestions
by government actors as a means toward curing (or at least mitigating) TIrelated behavior.1 0 5 Indeed, several scholars suggested such an approach,
with regard to both corporate compliance reform and financial institutional
reform.106 For the most part, however, Sarbanes-Oxley, Dodd-Frank and
the SEC Enforcement Division's latest settlements with financial
institutions appear rather conventional. Through some combination of

103

104

See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS

(Cass Sunstein ed., 2000).

See On Amir & Orly Lobel, Stumble, Predict,Nudge: How Behavioral

Economics Informs Law and Policy, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2098, 2131 (2008).
10For examples of New Governance-related proposals in regard to financial
institutions, see Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions:A
Processfor Reforming FinancialRegulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 881, 920 (2009).
106 See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community ofFate:
Toward
FinancialIndustry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011) (advocating selfregulation of risk within financial institutions by removing the financial industry's
government-guaranteed safety net); Weber, supra note 101, at 786 (suggesting selfregulatory approach for determining capital adequacy requirements); Cristie L. Ford, New
Governance, Compliance, and Principles-basedSecuritiesRegulation, 45 AM. Bus. L.J.

1, 28 (2008) (praising New Governance approach towards developing corporate
compliance principles).
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statutory fiat, regulatory rule-making, and enforcement-driven
adjudication, the government is telling, and not asking or encouraging
financial institutions and other corporations how to behave. Although

much of this enforcement effort includes structural regulation, it does not
reflect the cooperative, back-and-forth experimental approach championed
by New Governance theorists.10 7
Why, in a moment of complex crisis, has the government moved
away from choice architecture and New Governance, at least with regards
to corporate governance issues? One explanation is that responsive
regulation and choice architecture require trust, cooperation and a
108
sustained willingness to experiment
with various structures and devices.
Even in the best of times, it is difficult to sell such an agenda to the
general public, who possess many of the same desires for immediate
gratification as corporate actors.109 In the worst of times, New Governance
faces even greater hurdles. Skeptics understandably worry that cooperative
regulation may be a prescription for cosmetic, but ineffectual
regulation.110 An angry public, meanwhile, shows more interest in
punishing corporations than in creating useful and lasting structural
reforms." The characteristics that make New Governance so intuitively
attractive are the same characteristics that make it particularly weak and
107 I have argued this point in my critique of how the federal government uses
deferred prosecution agreements to regulate corporate compliance. See Baer, Governing,
supra note 42.
108See, e.g., id.
109 It also may be difficult to sell New Governance to traditionally trained
lawyers. See also Solomon, supra note 98, at 852-55 (arguing for re-training of lawyers
to reduce adversarial stances towards regulation and the setting of regulatory policy).

110See, e.g., Coffee & Sale, Redesigning, supra note 14, at 712 (criticizing self-

regulation as offering inadequate oversight of corporate and financial firms: "selfregulation has severe limitations and seems to work best only when the self-regulator's
duties are clearly demarcated and it is in turn subject to close regulatory oversight");
Kimberly Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the FailureofNegotiated Governance, 81
WASH. U. L. Q. 487, 491 (2003) (arguing that negotiated governance may simply allow
firms to make cosmetic but not real changes in internal compliance).
...
Miriam H. Baer, ChoosingPunishment, 92 B.U. L. REv. 577 (2012)
(exploring the implications of the public's preference for punishment over regulation
with regard to corporate governance policy).

Temporal Inconsistency

2013]

383

unstable. Accordingly, it may be some time before New Governance
emerges again as a strong regulatory alternative.11 2
CONCLUSION

I have focused on a series of choices that a well-intentioned and
highly knowledgeable regulator might confront when dealing with
pervasive time-inconsistent misconduct. As Professor Utset has shown in
this Article and other contributions, TI theory helps us understand why
otherwise sincere individuals stray from their initial intentions to comply
with the law. It offers a richer account of why corporate misconduct arises
and persists. What it does not do is tell us how policy makers should
respond to such misconduct. It may be folly to rely solely on sanctions as
a means of deterring TI-related misconduct, but that is only the beginning
of the regulatory story. No doubt, Utset is right to assert that corporate
actors engage in time-inconsistent decision-making. The larger question,
however, is what the public ought to do about it.

112

Ironically, this more traditional approach may be partially the product of

modern legal education's emphasis on adversarial relationships. See Solomon, supra note
98, at 855 (commenting that New Governance's success depends in part on "the next
generation of lawyers having the skills and inclination to overcome the culture of
adversarial legalism that pervades policy implementation today").

